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Alienage and Public Employment: The Need
for an Intermediate Standard in Equal
Protection
By Steven J. Casad*
The United States Supreme Court decisions in Foley v.
Connelie' and Ambach v. Norwick2 are the first in recent history
to uphold state laws excluding lawfully admitted permanent resi-
dent aliens4 from certain occupations. These cases upheld New
* B.A., 1978, University of California, Davis. Member, Third Year Class.
1. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
2. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
3. In the past, the United States Supreme Court has upheld state statutes prohibiting
permanent resident aliens from owning land; see Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb
v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thomp-
son, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); inheriting or devising real property, see Blythe v. Hinckley, 180
U.S. 333 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879); harvesting wildlife, see Pat-
sone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); operating a billiard parlor, see Ohio ex rel. Clarke
v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); and working on public works projects, see Crane v. New
York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
4. As used in this Note, the term lawfully admitted permanent resident alien (herein-
after referred to:as "aliens") refers to the "status of having been lawfully accorded the privi-
lege of residingpermanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the
immigration laws, such status not having changed." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1976). An alien
is "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." Id. § 1101(a)(3). A national of
the United States is "a citizen of the United States or a person who, though not a citizen of
the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States." Id. § 1101(a)(22). Per-
manent means a "relationship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished from tempo-
rary, but a relationship may be permanent even though it is one that may be dissolved
eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the individual, in accordance
with the law." Id. § 1101(a)(31). Residence means "the place of general abode; the place of
general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard
to intent." Id. § 1101(a)(33).
This Note is limited to a discussion of state regulation of "lawfully admitted permanent
resident aliens." It will not discuss those aliens who have entered the country without
processing by the Immigration and Naturalization Service or who have entered legally, but
have violated immigration laws since their entry, or federal regulation of lawfully admitted
permanent resident aliens. For a discussion of those topics, see Comment, The Legal Status
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York statutes that required state police officers and public school-
teachers, respectively, to be United States citizens.5 The Court's
rationale in each decision was that police officers and schoolteach-
ers occupy positions so essential to the "political community"' ,
that those who exercise these functions must identify with the val-
ues of the community.
Foley and Ambach represent a departure from the alienage
employment cases7 that established the right of aliens to work in
the "common occupations of the community."8 These cases held
of Undocumented Aliens: In Search of a Consistent Theory, 16 Hous. L. REv. 667 (1979);
Comment, Federalism and A New Equal Protection, 24 VILL. L. REV. 557 (1979); Note,
Undocumented Aliens: Education, Employment and Welfare in the United States and in
New Mexico, 9 N.M.L. Rav. 99 (1978-79). See also Maltz, The Burger Court and Alienage
Classifications, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 671 (1978); Walter, The Alien's Right to Work and the
Political Community's Right to Govern, 24 WAYm L. REV. 1181 (1979); Note, Public School
Teachers Covered by the "Government Function Exception" to Strict Scrutiny of Alienage
Classifications: Ambach v. Norwick, 12 CONN. L. REv. 137 (1979); Note, A Dual Standard
for State Discrimination Against Aliens, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1516 (1979); Note, Equal Treat-
ment of Aliens: Pre-emption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1979).
5. The statute involved in Foley was N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 215(3) (McKinney 1972) which
reads: "No person shall be appointed to the New York state police force unless he shall be a
citizen of the United States." At issue in Ambach was N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001(3) (McKinney
1970) which provides: "No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public
schools of the state who is: ... [niot a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not
apply, however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall
make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law
shall become a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply after July first,
nineteen hundred sixty-seven, to an alien teacher employed pursuant to regulations adopted
by the commissioner of education permitting such employment."
Pursuant to this statute, New York's Commissioner of Education promulgated the
following regulations: "Citizenship. A teacher who is not a citizen of the United States or
who has not declared an intention of becoming a citizen may be issued a provisional certifi-
cate providing such teacher has the appropriate educational qualifications as defined in the
regulations and (1) possesses skills or competencies not readily available among teachers
holding citizenship or (2) is unable to declare intention of becoming a citizen for valid statu-
tory reasons." 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 80.2(1) (1978).
6. The Court has recognized that each state has the power to prescribe the qualifica-
tions of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen, see Boyd v. Nebraska ex
rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892), because of the state's obligation "to preserve the basic
conception of a political community." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973) (quot-
ing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)).
7. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
8. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), struck down an Arizona statute that required
private employers to employ a work force of at least 80% native-born citizens as a violation
of equal protection. The Court found that "the right to work for a living in the common
occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportu-
nity that it was the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to secure." Id. at 41.
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alienage to be a suspect classification9 and applied the "strict scru-
tiny" test 0 to strike down statutes barring aliens as a class from
9. Modem equal protection law recently has been in a state of flux. Under the tradi-
tional equal protection analysis, a court must defer to the judgment of the state legislature
and uphold a statute so long as the means employed by the state in effectuating its purposes
bears a rational relation to the state's interest. Thus a statute "will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961). See also Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957); Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). The Court continues to apply the traditional rational
basis test in areas of economic regulation and social welfare. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485 (1970). Outside the economic and social welfare area, however, the Court has
recognized certain "suspect" classifications which trigger the "most rigid scrutiny." Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
Judicial recognition of suspect classifications originated in Justice Stone's "footnote
four" in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), in which he asked
"whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 152-53 n.4. Suspect classifications
that now have been recognized include race, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Mc-
Laughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954);
national origin, see Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); and,
most recently, alienage, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). To justify a
suspect classification, the state must show an "overriding statutory purpose," McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. at 192, and that the means the state employs to achieve its statutory goal
are "precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 643 (1973).
As a result of the acknowledgement of certain classifications as suspect, equal protec-
tion analysis evolved into a two-tier approach with the traditional analysis being used in the
economic and social welfare areas, and the strict scrutiny test being applied to suspect clas-
sifications. This approach created a division in equal protection analysis because suspect
classifications were always struck down under the strict scrutiny test, while nonsuspect clas-
sifications were almost always upheld under the deferential rational basis standard. To nar-
row this division, several commentators have proposed intermediate standards of review be-
tween strict scrutiny and rational basis. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1972); Nowak,
Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee- Prohibited,
Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 Gao. L.J. 1071 (1974). The United States Su-
preme Court has developed such an intermediate standard for classifications based on sex.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See notes 203-10 & accompanying text infra.
Under the Craig standard, classifications that distinguish groups on the basis of sex must
"serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives." 429 U.S. at 197. Although Craig appears to set up a third tier in equal
protection analysis, four Justices express dissatisfaction both with a two-tier and a three-
tier approach. Id. at 210-11 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 211-14 (Stevens, J., concurring);
id. at 215-17 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 217-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall has indicated that he would abandon the two-tier approach and substitute a slid-
ing-scale approach. See note 202 infra.
10. The "strict scrutiny" test is the term commonly given to the standard of judicial
review that is used when a statute creating constitutionally suspect classifications is chal-
lenged as a violation of the guarantee of equal protection. The Court has phrased the test in
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engaging in certain occupations 1 and from receiving government
benefits12 as being in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. s In each case, the Court found the citizen-
various ways, requiring an "overriding," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. at 192, or "compel-
ling," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1966), state interest, and means that are
"precisely drawn," Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 643, or "necessary ... to the accom-
plishment" of the state's interest, In re Grifflths, 413 U.S. at 721-22. In examining classifica-
tions based on alienage, the Court has stated: "[T]o justify use of a suspect classification, a
State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and sub-
stantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary.. . . to the accomplishment' of its
purpose or the safeguarding of its interest." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 721-22 (footnotes
omitted). Professor Nowak has interpreted the strict scrutiny test to mean "that the justices
will not defer to the decision of the other branches of government but will instead indepen-
dently determine the degree of relationship which the classification bears to a constitution-
ally compelling end.... The Court will not accept every permissible government purpose
as sufficient to support a classification under this test, but will instead require the govern-
ment to show that it is pursuing a 'compelling' or 'overriding' end-one whose value is so
great that it justifies the limitation of fundamental constitutional values. Even if the govern-
ment can demonstrate such an end, the Court will not uphold the classification unless the
justices have independently reached the conclusion that the classification is necessary to
promote that compelling interest. If the justices are of the opinion that the classification
need not be employed to achieve such an end, the law will be held to violate the equal
protection guarantee." J. NowAK, R. ROrUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 524 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as NowAK]. The traditional analysis applied by the Court to a legislative
classification challenged under the equal protection clause is the "rational basis test." "Al-
though no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect
some group of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only
if the classification rests on the grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimi-
nation will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). Under modern equal protection analy-
sis, the rational basis test is used for all nonsuspect and nongender classifications. See note
9 & accompanying text supra. See also notes 210-14 & accompanying text infra. See NowAx,
supra at 524.
In the "common occupations" cases, the Court scrutinized statutory classifications to
determine whether such classifications were "'necessary ... to the accomplishment' of [the
state's] purpose," In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 721-22 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 196 (1964)), or "the narrowness of the limits within which the discrimination is
defined." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 642. The standard of review employed in the
common occupations cases thus required the statute to employ more precise means than
would be necessary under the traditional rational basis test.
11. See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (engineers);
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (admission to the bar); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973) (state civil service).
12. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (financial aid for higher education);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (welfare benefits).
13. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
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ship requirements that the states had imposed in order to preserve
the occupation or benefit for official members of the community to
be impermissible.
14
Although Foley and Ambach represent a departure from these
"common occupations" cases, they are not without precedent. The
Court in Sugarman v. Dougall15 provided that a state may, "in an
appropriately defined class of positions, require citizenship as a
qualification for office.""8 This requirement could apply to "state
elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial
positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation,
execution, or review of broad public policy perform functions that
go to the heart of representative government."1 7 In such situations,
the Court's "scrutiny will not be so demanding ... ."' As is evi-
dent by the Court's language, Sugarman set forth no firm guide-
lines as to the scope of the nonelective executive, legislative, or ju-
dicial positions within this exception. Nor did the Court define the
standard of review to be applied in such cases.
This Note examines the equal protection issues raised by Fo-
ley and Ambach. It first explores the breadth of the Sugarman ex-
ception"9 and the standard of review contemplated for the excep-
tion cases. An analysis of the individual Justices' opinions will
reveal that within the Court there are three views on each ques-
tion, each of which represents a different balance of values, and
accordingly a different outcome. Finally, the Note concludes by of-
fering two suggestions. First, it suggests factors the Court might
employ in determining whether the Sugarman exception applies to
a given case. Second, it advocates the adoption of an intermediate
standard of review in exception cases that will allow the Court to
give more consideration to the individualized determination
value.20 Such a standard will achieve a just balance between com-
14. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. at 10-12; Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero,
426 U.S. at 601; In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 725; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 646;
Graham v. Richardson, 413 U.S. at 374.
15. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
16. Id. at 647.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 648.
19. The term "Sugarman exception" will hereinafter be used to refer to dicta in
Sugarman v. Dougall that a classification based on citizenship might be subject to less rigor-
ous judicial scrutiny for certain elective and nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial
officers who execute broad public policy. See notes 15-18 & accompanying text supra.
20. The term "individualized determination value" will hereinafter be used to refer to
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peting values involved in the exception cases.
The Pre-Foley Cases
The fountainhead of modern alienage cases2' is Graham v.
Richardson, 2 which struck down a statute imposing citizenship
and residency requirements on the right to receive state welfare
benefits .2  The Graham Court held that "classifications based on
alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently sus-
pect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. 24 The Court's holding
the rationale underlying the cases upholding the alien's right to work in the common occu-
pations of the community. See note 8 & accompanying text supra. In these common occupa-
tions cases, the Court determined that wholesale exclusion of aliens from certain occupa-
tions and benefit programs on the basis of a presumed class characteristic was an undue
burden on those aliens who were otherwise qualified for the positions or programs. The
Court stated this idea in In re Griffiths: "Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens
are unsuited to the practice of law be justification for a wholesale ban," 413 U.S. at 725, and
concluded, "'felven in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an
applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or
when their action is invidiously discriminatory.'" Id. (quoting Schware v. Board of Bar Ex-
aminers, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)). Underlying these statements is the premise that an alien
should not be excluded from an occupation or a benefit without an individual determination
of his or her qualifications.
Statutes that create "irrebuttable presumptions," which categorize a group on the basis
of a presumed universal characteristic, such as those involved in alienage classifications,
have been disfavored by the Court in the past. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the
Court held that permanent irrebuttable presumptions are suspect unless it is demonstrated
that the presumption accurately characterizes all members of the class or that there are no
reasonable alternatives to the statute. Id. at 452. The Court's recent disfavor of the irrebut-
table presumption analysis renders any continued reliance on such a standard questionable.
See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771-73 (1975).
21. For cases prior to Foley which upheld restrictions on aliens in general, see note 3
supra.
22. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
23. Graham involved a combination of challenges to citizenship and durational resi-
dency requirements for welfare benefits in Arizona and Pennsylvania. The Arizona statute
at issue was ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 46-233 (Supp. 1970) (since amended) which provided:
"A. No person shall be entitled to general assistance who does not meet and maintain the
following requirements: 1. Is a citizen of the United States, or has resided in the United
States a total of fifteen years." Similar provisions in ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 46-252(2)
(Supp. 1970) (since amended), which provided for old age assistance and assistance to the
blind, respectively, were also challenged.
The Pennsylvania statute at issue was PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 43(2) (Purdon 1968)
(since amended) which stated: "Except as hereinafter otherwise provided .... needy per-
sons of the classes defined in clauses (1) and (2) of this section shall be eligible for assis-
tance. (1) Persons for whose assistance federal financial participation is available to the
Commonwealth; (2) Other persons who are citizens of the United States ..
24. 403 U.S. at 372 (footnotes omitted).
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was based on its determination that aliens are a "'discrete and
insular' minority" 5 for whom heightened judicial solicitude is
appropriate. 6
Following Graham, Sugarman v. Dougall27 invalidated a New
York statute barring all aliens from the state's competitive civil
service.2 8 The Court found the statute overbroad because the
state's interest in assuring that civil servants have an undivided
allegiance to the state was not related to every civil service posi-
tion 29 and thus could not withstand strict judicial scrutiny. The
major importance of Sugarman, however, was the exception it set
forth to the rule of alienage as a suspect classification. The Court
phrased the exception in the following language:
Neither do we hold that a State may not, in an appropriately
defined class of positions, require citizenship as a qualification for
office .... "[E]ach State has the power to prescribe the qualifi-
cations of its officers and the manner in which they shall be cho-
sen" [based on the state's power] "to preserve the basic concep-
tion of the political community" . . . . [T]his power and
responsibility ... applies to ... persons holding state elective or
important nonelective executive, legislative, or judicial positions,
for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution,
or review of broad public policy perform functions that go to the
heart of representative government .... [O]ur scrutiny will not
be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within
a State's constitutional prerogatives.30
Although it is dicta, the Sugarman exception set the stage for
modification of the Graham strict scrutiny rule by suggesting that
a citizenship requirement could be valid"1 for those occupations
25. Id: (quoting with approval United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938)). See note 9 supra.
26. A second basis for the Court's holding was the supremacy of federal immigration
and naturalization laws. Any state restriction interfering with the federal determination that
an alien who is admitted to permanent residence is fit to live in any of the nation's commu-
nities is invalid under the supremacy clause. 402 U.S. at 376-80.
27. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
28. The statute at issue in Sugarman was N.Y. Civ. SRV. LAW § 53(1) (McKinney
1973) which stated: "Except as herein otherwise provided, no person shall be eligible for
appointment for any position in the competitive class unless he is a citizen of the United
States."
29. 413 U.S. at 642.
30. Id. at 647-48 (quoting Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892)); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972) (citations omitted).
31. 413 U.S. at 648.
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that form the "heart of representative government. '3 2
In re Griffiths,8 decided the same day as Sugarman, invali-
dated a Connecticut rule of court limiting admission to the state
bar to United States citizens under the strict scrutiny test.' The
Court found that the state's interest in assuring the qualifications
of attorneys was legitimate, but that a citizenship requirement was
not necessary to the promotion of this interest,35 stating the "pos-
sibility that some resident aliens are unsuited to the practice of
law [would not] be a justification for a wholesale ban."36 The Court
also rejected the state's argument that the citizenship requirement
was necessary because an attorney is an "officer of the court" im-
bued with some aspects of governmental authority, such as the
power to issue subpoenas. 7 It stated that a lawyer's duties "hardly
involve matters of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility
as to entrust them only to citizens." 8 The Court suggested several
alternate ways in which the state could promote its interest in as-
suring the qualifications of its attorneys, such as an oath, investi-
gation of the individual applicant's qualifications, and continuing
scrutiny by the bar. 9
The pre-Foley cases4 thus developed the doctrine that state
restrictions on aliens in private employment or government benefit
programs will be suspect and subject to strict scrutiny in all cases
except those within the Sugarman exception. An essential compo-
nent of this strict scrutiny is the examination of the means chosen
by the state to assure that the statute is precisely drawn to protect
the state's interest. This serves a twofold purpose. First, it assures
that the statute is tailored so as to exclude aliens from only those
positions or benefits necessary to achieve the state's interest. Sec-
ond, it assures that a determination is made as to whether a less
32. Id. at 647.
33. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
34. CONN. R. CT. 8(1) (1966) provided: "To entitle an applicant to admission to the
bar ... he must satisfy the committee: First: That he is a citizen of the United States."
35. 413 U.S. at 725.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 723.
38. Id. at 724.
39. Id. at 725-27.
40. In subsequent cases, the Court used the Graham-Sugarman rationale to invalidate
citizenship requirements for the engineering profession, Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and eligibility for financial assistance for higher education,
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
[Vol. 32
discriminatory method will achieve the same goal. This approach
serves notice to the states that only the most precisely tailored
statute will survive an equal protection challenge, thus ensuring
that an alien's qualifications for employment are based on his or
her individual qualifications and not on characteristics that aliens
as a class are presumed to have. As a result, an alien will have a
better opportunity to protect his or her ability to work in the com-
mon occupations of the community.
41
Foley and Ambach: Defining the Breadth of the
Sugarman Exception
Foley v. Connelie
Foley v. Connelie42 was the first case to be decided on the
basis of the Sugarman exception.' Edmund Foley, a citizen of Ire-
land who had lived in the United States since 1973, applied for a
position as a New York state trooper. The State Police Commis-
sioner refused to allow Foley to take the qualification test because
noncitizens were statutorily prohibited from becoming members of
the state police force.44
Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion in Foley,
joined by Justices Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist.45 The
majority refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard,46 finding
that its application in every case would "obliterate all the distinc-
tions between citizens and aliens. '47 Instead, the Court found the
police function fell within the Sugarman exception because the po-
lice exercised discretionary power, the use of which "substantially
41. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379 (1970); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,
42 (1915).
42. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
43. See notes 30-31 & accompanying text supra.
44. The Commissioner's action was based on N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 215(3) (McKinney
1972) which prohibited noncitizens from being appointed to the state police force. See note
5 supra. Foley brought a class action in United States District Court seeking a declaration
that the New York statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. A three-judge district court granted summary judgment for the state. 419 F. Supp.
889 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Foley appealed, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction. 430 U.S.
944 (1977).
45. Justice Blackmun also concurred in the result, although he did not join in the
majority opinion. Thus, six Justices voted to uphold the statute.
46. See note 10 supra.
47. 435 U.S. at 295.
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affects members of the political community."4 s However, the Court
added a cautionary footnote stating that the classification of posi-
tions as those holding discretionary power to affect the community
could not" 'sweep indiscriminately'. . without regard to the dif-
ferences in the positions involved.
'49
Having found the police function to be within the Sugarman
exception, the majority then purported to apply the rational basis
standard of review.50 When the exception criteria are combined
with the rational basis standard used by the Foley Court, however,
a standard more stringent than a traditional rational basis test
may in fact have been applied. Rather than merely looking at
whether any state of facts could reasonably be conceived to war-
rant the classification, the Court appeared to seek greater justifica-
tions for the application of the rational basis test, finding that the
police function "fulfills a most fundamental obligation of govern-
ment to its constituency"51 and carries with it the power to "[af-
fect] members of the public significantly and often in the most
sensitive areas of daily life. '52 To the majority the police function
was one in which "citizenship bears a rational relation to the spe-
cial demands of the particular position." 53
A curious aspect of the Foley case is that Justice Blackmun
concurs only in the result while stating that the "prior cases clearly
establish the standards applied in this [case]."" His concurring
opinion essentially mirrors that of the majority, and the reason for
his refusal to join the majority remains unclear. The most likely
explanation is that he sees a narrower exception in the language of
Sugarman than that which the majority defined through its crite-
ria,55 but nevertheless finds the police function within his interpre-
tation of the exception.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart disagreed with Jus-
tice Blackmun, declaring that he viewed Foley as inconsistent with
"the full sweep of the reasoning and authority of some of our past
48. Id. at 296.
49. Id. at 296-97 n.5 (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 300.
51. Id. at 297.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 300.
54. Id. at 301 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
55. See notes 48-49 & accompanying text supra. See also notes 136-51 & accompany-
ing text infra.
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decisions. '56 Justice Stewart indicated that he was having reserva-
tions about the Graham strict scrutiny line of cases, stating: "It is
only because I have become increasingly doubtful about the valid-
ity of those decisions (in at least some of which I concurred) that I
join the opinion of the Court in this case."
'57
The dissenting opinions indicated no reservations about previ-
ous decisions. Justice Marshall reiterated his view that strict scru-
tiny should apply in all alienage cases.58 Justice Stevens stated
that aliens as a class cannot be barred from professional employ-
ment on the basis of characteristics that aliens as a class are pre-
sumed to possess.5" He postulated that the apparent disqualifying
characteristic in Foley was a foreign allegiance which raised doubts
about an alien's loyalty and trustworthiness. 0 Justice Stevens
found the Court's position inconsistent with Griffiths, stating,
"Unless the Court repudiates its holding in In re Griffiths . .. it
must reject any conclusive presumption that aliens, as a class, are
disloyal or untrustworthy."61
The dissents also expressed a narrower view of the Sugarman
exception than the majority and would have applied it only to
those positions which formulate policy, not to those which merely
implement policy. 2 Justice Stevens further disagreed with the ma-
jority's interpretation of the "alien-citizen distinction,"6 s finding
56. 435 U.S. at 300 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's position may be shared
silently by some of the other Justices. For instance, Justice White voted with the majority in
the Graham strict scrutiny line of cases, but also sided with the majority in Foley and in
Ambach. Thus, he too may have reservations about the previous alienage cases and, with the
majority, may desire a broad Sugarman exception to counterbalance those cases.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 303 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 308.
61. Id. (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 304 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. The most obvious and pervasive distinction between aliens and native-born and
naturalized citizens is that the former has the right to vote and hold public office, a right
that is denied to the latter group because of their alienage. In Foley, the Court noted that
"[t]he act of becoming a citizen is more than a ritual with no content beyond the fanfare of
ceremony. A new citizen has become a member of a Nation, part of a people distinct from
others .... The individual, at that point, belongs to the polity and is entitled to partici-
pate in the processes of democratic decisionmaking. Accordingly, we have recognized a
'State's historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political insti-
tutions'. . . as part of the sovereign's obligation 'to preserve the basic conception of a polit-
ical community."' 435 U.S. at 295-96 (citations omitted). The individual members of the
Court have differing opinions as to the significance of the distinction between aliens and
citizens beyond this basic statement. For a discussion of these opinions, see notes 90-92,
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the "privilege of participating in the formulation of broad public
policy-a privilege largely denied to the institutions exercising the
police function in our society [to be] the essence of individual citi-
zenship." 64 Thus, for Justice Stevens, citizenship, because it
granted the right to vote, was a prerequisite to participation in the
political community rather than a means of ensuring an applicant's
employment qualifications.
Ambach v. Norwick
Ambach v. Norwick " involved two resident aliens who were
denied positions as public schoolteachers because of their alienage.
Appellees Ambach and Dachinger were citizens of Great Britain
and Finland, respectively. Both were married to United States citi-
zens and had resided in this country for over ten years.66 The stat-
ute excluding them from teaching positions was somewhat differ-
ent from the statute excluding aliens from state police positions in
Foley.e7 It granted certification to all teachers who were citizens,
who had applied for citizenship, or who had filed an intention to
apply for citizenship when they became eligible.68 Thus, only those
persons who chose to remain aliens were excluded by the statute.6'
The Court upheld the law by a five to four majority. 0 Justice
Powell wrote the majority opinion which was joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger, and Justices Stewart, White, and Rehnquist. By plac-
ing greater emphasis on the alien-citizen distinction, the majority
endorsed a broader interpretation of the Sugarman exception than
they appeared to in Foley. The distinction between aliens and citi-
zens was found to be "fundamental to the definition and govern-
ment of the state" 1 because citizenship represented an association
101-03, 131-35 & accompanying text infra.
64. 435 U.S. at 310-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
66. Id. at 71.
67. See note 5 supra.
68. See note 5 supra.
69. Appellee Norwick sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute in United States
District Court, and appellee Dachinger obtained leave to intervene as a plaintiff. A three-
judge district court struck down the statute as a violation of equal protection. Norwick v.
Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The state appealed, and the Court noted proba-
ble jurisdiction. 436 U.S. 902 (1978).
70. With the exception of Justice Blackmun, who wrote the dissent, the Justices were
aligned the same as in Foley. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
71. 441 U.S. at 75.
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with the polity that could not be equalled by any substituted form
of allegiance 2.7 The special significance attached to citizenship al-
lows the states a wide latitude in excluding noncitizens from gov-
ernment functions.
7 3
Whereas in Foley the Court looked to the discretionary powers
involved in the occupation, and whether use of that power could
substantially affect the lives of citizens74 in interpreting the scope
of the Sugarman exception, the Court in Ambach emphasized the
role of public schoolteachers in the political community and the
discretion and responsibility teachers had in fulfilling that role. 5
The Ambach majority also did not mention the caveat set forth in
Foley: that the classification not sweep indiscriminately. 6 It thus
appears the Ambach majority broadened the criteria used to define
the exception from positions with discretionary power that assert
direct power over the populace to positions with discretionary
power that have a somewhat less direct effect on the lives of citi-
zens. Applying the rational basis test to these criteria, the Ambach
Court found that the legislature, having in mind the importance of
education, may determine eligibility requirements for teachers on
the assumption that generally persons who are citizens, or who
have not declined the opportunity to seek citizenship, are better
qualified than those who choose to remain aliens.7
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens. Justice Blackmun refused to apply the
Sugarman exception to public schoolteachers and argued that the
Ambach case fell within the "common occupations" cases rather
than the isolated decision in Foley.78 In criticizing the majority
holding, Justice Blackmun noted in particular that the statute did
not apply to private schools,79 that it was "'neither narrowly con-
fined nor precise in its application,' " that there were better
methods of choosing teachers apart from a citizenship require-
ment,"' and that the majority opinion was inconsistent with
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See note 48 & accompanying text supra.
75. 441 U.S. at 75.
76. See note 49 & accompanying text supra.
77. 441 U.S. at 80-81 & n.14.
78. Id. at 81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 86.
80. Id. at 87 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973)).
81. Id.
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Griffiths.8 2
Ambach appears to shift the emphasis of the inquiry in
Sugarman exception cases away from the nature of the discretion-
ary power inherent in the position and towards whether the posi-
tion serves an important governmental function. This broader in-
quiry allows the exception to include a position like teaching which
may entail the use of power in such a way as to have an indirect,
intangible, and lasting effect on the community: the power to
shape the minds of children. 3
Ambach's broad interpretation of the Sugarman exception
creates further confusion as to which occupations the exception en-
compasses. Similar confusion exists as to what standard of review
the Court in fact applied in the exception cases.
The Breadth of the Sugarman Exception
An examination of the historical origin of the Sugarman
exception reveals language in several pre-Foley cases" suggesting
82. Id. at 88-89.
83. Studies suggest that the school is the most important factor in the political sociali-
zation of individuals in our society. See R. HEss & J. TORNEY, THE DavELopmNT op PoLrs-
CAL ATTITUDES IN CHLDREN 162-63 (1967). For a discussion of the role of a schoolteacher in
influencing a child's attitudes toward the political community, see Note, Aliens' Right to
Teach: Political Socialization and the Public Schools, 85 YAuE L.J. 90, 99-105 (1975). "In
exchanges with the student, a teacher inevitably conveys many of his or her own cultural
attitudes, influencing political orientation well beyond the formal curriculum and any con-
scious effort to impart political information." Id. at 104.
Another study, however, has concluded that teachers tend only to advance and rein-
force nonreflective attitudes of allegiance and responsibility toward government. Massialas,
Some Propositions About the Role of the School in the Formation of Political Behavior
and Political Attitudes of Students: Cross-National Perspectives, 19 Comp. EDUC. Rav. 171
(1975). The same study found that students learned about concepts of loyalty in the educa-
tion process, but did not learn the skills necessary to participate effectively in the political
system. Id. at 171. Moreover, other studies found that formal civics courses have relatively
little effect on a student's perception of politics or his or her participation in the political
process. Denhardt, Civics Instruction-A Social Science Commentary, Improving College &
University Teaching, at 245-46, Autumn 1975. Indeed, one study found that a civics curric-
ulum had little effect on political opinions at the high school level. Langton & Jennings,
Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States, 62 Am.
POL. Sci. REV. 852-67 (1968). It thus appears that although schoolteachers have an opportu-
nity to impart their own political attitudes to students, most of this effort simply reinforces
attitudes about loyalty to the government and is subject to dilution by other sources of
political socialization. Further, the issue of whether a teacher can be denied employment on
the basis of speech that he or she may impart to students raises substantial first amendment
issues.
84. See note 7 supra.
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that the exception was intended to be narrow.s5 The Court, how-
ever, provided no guidelines in either Sugarman, Foley, or Ambach
for the application of the exception. The Court's failure to provide
guidance is likely the result of the conflicting views within the
Court on the breadth of the exception. Three different interpreta-
tions are reflected in the Foley majority, the Ambach majority, and
the Foley dissents.
The Foley majority opinion extends the Sugarman exception
to those positions that involve a direct assertion of power over the
members of the political community. The Foley majority opinion
thus implicitly adopted two criteria to determine whether a partic-
ular position is included within the exception: (1) the discretionary
power involved in the position and (2) whether the execution of
policy in that position could substantially affect members of the
political community.86 In addition, the Court stated it would look
to see if the citizenship requirement "'sweeps indiscriminately'
. . . without regard to the differences in the positions involved.
87
Underlying the Foley majority opinion rests the concept of a
political community" comprised of citizens or members defined by
the alien-citizen distinction.8 9 The Foley majority concluded that
those positions asserting direct power over individuals in the polit-
ical community should be staffed by members of that community.
Citizens, as members of this political community, are presumed to
be familiar with its traditions and values;90 aliens, because they
technically owe allegiance to another sovereign, are not. The Court
thus reasoned the citizenship requirement ensures that the "choice
... and right. . . of the people to be governed by their citizen
85. In Sugarman, for example, the Court intimated that citizenship could be a rele-
vant qualification in "an appropriately defined class of positions," 413 U.S. at 647, and that
a "restriction on the employment of noncitizens, narrowly confined, could be employed in
defining 'political community."' Id. at 649. Similar indications appeared in Griffiths where
the Court established the proposition that not all those in a position to exercise some gov-
ernmental power are within the exception. 413 U.S. at 728-29. With respect to the
Sugarman exception the Court in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), stated: "Sugarman
makes quite clear, the Court had in mind a State's historical and constitutional powers to
define the qualifications of voters, or of 'elective or important nonelective' officials ....
Griffiths. . . reflects the narrowness of the exception." Id. at 11.
86. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 296. See note 48 & accompanying text supra.
87. 435 U.S. at 296-97 n.5. See note 49 & accompanying text supra.
88. Id. at 296. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)).
89. See note 63 supra.
90. 435 U.S. at 299-300.
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peers" 91 is preserved.92
The Foley majority found that the police function fit well into
this interpretation of the Sugarman exception. The Court noted
that the police had an "infinite variety of discretionary power,1
9 3
including the powers of search, seizure, and arrest, the resort to
lawful force, and the investigation of suspect conduct.94 The Court
also found the execution of these powers affected "members of the
public significantly, and often in the most sensitive areas of daily
life."95 Based on these findings and its interpretation of the scope
of the Sugarman exception, the Court held the citizenship require-
ment for police officers to be sufficiently related to the state's in-
terest in maintaining a loyal police force to survive judicial
scrutiny.98
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Foley, interpreted the
Sugarman exception to apply only to positions directly participat-
ing in the formulation and execution of broad public policy, and
not to those positions merely implementing policy. 17 The former
group was defined as those who have the "responsibility for actu-
ally setting government policy pursuant to a delegation of substan-
tial authority from the legislature." ' With this definition, Justice
91. Id. at 296.
92. Consistent with the view that aliens can be excluded from positions which assert
direct power over members of the political community is Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134
(D. Md. 1974), afl'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976), which upheld both Maryland and federal laws
which excluded aliens from jury service. The three-judge federal district court found that
both the state and federal governments had a "compelling interest" in "assuring that those
who make the ultimate factual decisions on issues of personal liberty and property rights
under our system of justice be either native born or naturalized citizens, because it may
fairly be concluded that as a class they are more likely to make informed and just decisions
in such matters than are noncitizens." 370 F. Supp. at 136. The court held that jurors per-
formed functions "'that go to the heart of representative government,'" id. at 137, from
which the states could conclude that native-born and naturalized citizens "would be [more]
conversant with the social and political institutions of our society, the customs of the local-
ity, the nuances of local tradition and language." Id. at 138. "There is no corresponding
basis for assuming that resident aliens, who owe allegiance not to any state or to the federal
government, but are subjects of a foreign power, have so assimilated our societal and politi-
cal mores that an equal reliance could be placed on their performing as well as citizens the
duties of jurors in our judicial system." Id. See also United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518
F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding a federal statute excluding aliens from federal juries).
93. 435 U.S. at 297.
94. Id. at 293.
95. Id. at 297.
96. Id. at 300.
97. Id. at 304 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 304.
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Marshall framed the issue in Foley to be whether "the job of state
trooper [is] a position involving direct participation 'in the formu-
lation, execution, or review of broad public policy?' ,e Concluding
that the duties of a police officer consist of applying a limited array
of previously formulated policy decisions, e10 Justice Marshall
found the employment of aliens in state trooper positions
presented no danger to the political community.
The dissenters also had an entirely different interpretation of
the alien-citizen distinction. Justice Stevens defined the "essence
of individual citizenship" as the "privilege of participating in the
formulation of broad public policy .... "101 Citizenship denoted
an association with the political community which carried with it
the right to participate in democratic decisionmaking by exercising
the right to vote.1 0 2 Those who had this privilege were the true
formulators of broad public policy. It was the exclusion of aliens
from this function that was essential to the preservation of the po-
litical community.103
Justice Stevens also questioned the purpose of the majority's
interpretation of the exception. In his opinion, the majority did not
identify the characteristic that justified exclusion of aliens from
important governmental functions. ° He considered a "satisfactory
answer to this question. . . essential to the validity of the rule."' 15
Justice Stevens postulated that the exception may be based on two
premises: (1) that because aliens do not participate in democratic
decisionmaking, they are not part of the political community,110
and (2) that because aliens owe allegiance to another nation, they
99. Id. at 303 n.1.
100. Id. at 304-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also id. at 310 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
101. Id. at 310-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 311.
103. Id. at 311 n.4. See note 63 supra. Justice Marshall suggested that citizenship and
the values it entailed were not necessary to the police function. He observed that New York
law authorized any person to arrest another. 435 U.S. at 306. See N.Y. Cium. PROC. LAw
§ 140.30 (McKinney 1979). Included within this power of arrest was the authorization to
make a search incident to the arrest. Id. See United States v. Rosse, 418 F.2d 38, 39-40 (2d
Cir. 1969); United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595, 600 (2d Cir. 1963) (upholding search inci-
dent to a citizen's arrest under New York law). Although the police function carried with it
a direct power to affect the lives of citizens, Justice Marshall concluded that because this
power was available to everyone in the community, restriction of its official exercise to citi-
zens would serve no purpose. 435 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 311-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 308.
106. Id. at 312.
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are untrustworthy and disloyal. 0 7 He rejected the first rationale as
being irrelevant to the Foley case, based on his narrow view of the
Sugarman exception.10 8 He also rejected the second rationale not-
ing that Griffiths had rejected any "conclusive presumption that
aliens, as a class, are disloyal or untrustworthy."109 Justice Stevens
concluded: "If there is no group characteristic which explains the
discrimination, one can only conclude that it is without any justifi-
cation that has not already been rejected by the Court." '
In Justice Stevens' opinion, any application of the Sugarman
exception must be based on an express characteristic, a valid, con-
stitutionally permissible reason, which will justify the exclusion of
aliens from important government functions. Vague references to
the significance of citizenship will not suffice. In short, Justice Ste-
vens appears to believe that the only permissible reason for dis-
qualifying aliens from a particular occupation must be based on
individual qualifications, in effect ruling out any permissible basis
for the exclusion of aliens as a class. Justice Stevens thus appears
to reject the Sugarman exception and, like the Graham strict scru-
tiny cases,"' focuses his dissent on the individualized determina-
tion value.
1 12
The Ambach majority, by framing the issue differently,
created a broader view of the Sugarman exception than that ex-
pressed by the Foley majority opinion. Rather than asking, as in
Foley, whether police officers were important nonelective officials
who executed broad public policy,1 s the majority inquired whether
the teaching position was within the "governmental function" ex-
ception. 11 4 This distinction is reflected in the factors the Court
considered in Ambach in determining whether the Sugarman ex-
ception applied to public schoolteachers.
The Court looked to "the role of public education and to the
degree of responsibility and discretion teachers possess in fulfilling
that role." 5 The Court followed this statement with a citational
107. Id. at 308, 312.
108. Id. at 312 & n.5.
109. Id. at 308.
110. Id. at 312.
111. See notes 22-39 & accompanying text supra.
112. See notes 40-41 & accompanying text supra. See also note 20 supra.
113. 441 U.S. at 75.
114. 435 U.S. at 296.
115. Id.
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reference to Foley. However, the citation does not relate to the cri-
teria used to define the exception in Foley,116 but to the discussion
in that case of the discretionary role of the police officer.117 The
Ambach majority thus adopted only one of the factors mentioned
in Foley-whether the position entails discretionary power 18-- but
made no mention of the second factor in Foley as to whether use of
that discretionary power could have a substantial and immediate
effect on the lives of citizens.1"9 Nor did the Court mention the
caveat in Foley that a citizenship requirement cannot "sweep in-
discriminately without regard for the differences in positions
involved.M
20
Ambach represents a shift in the Court's inquiry from the na-
ture of the power inherent in the position to the special impor-
tance of the function which encompasses the position, as that func-
tion relates to the political community. Thus, police officers and
teachers both perform functions that are fundamental to the polit-
ical community. By virtue of his or her position, a police officer can
assert direct, tangible power that can have a substantial effect on
the lives of citizens, such as the power to arrest.12 Teachers, on the
other hand, do not assert such direct power. Instead, they possess
the ability to shape the minds of young children, a power that is
better characterized as indirect and intangible. 122 The effect of this
exercise of power may not be evident for years. Moreover, it will be
the collective product of many different teachers, in addition to
extrascholastic influences, that shape a child's values and opinions.
By shifting the focus of the exception inquiry, the Ambach major-
ity broadened the exception to allow the inclusion of those posi-
tions that probably would not have been included in the narrower
interpretation of the exception set forth in Foley.
The greater emphasis that the Ambach majority placed on the
116. See notes 48-49, 86-87 & accompanying text supra.
117. The majority in Foley describes the police function as "a most fundamental obli-
gation of government to its constituency," 435 U.S. at 297, and notes the discretionary
power exercised by police officers and its effect on citizens' lives, i.e., the right to stop and
frisk, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); the ability to enter a building by force in the
execution of a warrant, see Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); and the power to
stop vehicles on the highway, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
118. See notes 48, 86 & accompanying text supra.
119. See notes 48, 86 & accompanying text supra.
120. 435 U.S. at 296-97 n.5. See notes 49, 87 & accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 51-52, 94-95 & accompanying text supra.
122. See note 83 supra.
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importance of the position to the political community is evidenced
by the greater attention it gave to the concept of public employ-
ment. In its discussion of previous cases, the Court refers to the
state "public interest doctrine." 12 This doctrine was used in the
early half of the century to exclude aliens from activities that per-
tained to "'the regulation or distribution of the public domain, or
of the common property or resources of the people of the State
.. ",124 The state public interest doctrine was seriously under-
mined in Graham which held that a state could not attempt to
limit its welfare expenditures on the basis of that doctrine.2 5 The
Ambach majority, however, noted that although the Court had
"departed substantially" from the public interest doctrine, it had
not "abandoned the general principle that some state functions are
so bound up with the operation of the State as a governmental
entity as to permit the exclusion from those functions of all per-
sons who have not become part of the process of self-govern-
ment. '126 The public interest doctrine12 7 thus may be experiencing
a limited revival in the context of the Sugarman exception.
There is, in the Ambach opinion, another reason to believe
that this revival is occurring. It involves the nature of the statute
upheld, which applied the citizenship requirement only to public,
and not to private, schoolteachers. 28 In finding the statute within
the exception, the Court noted that the citizenship requirement
was limited to a government function because it applied only to
123. 441 U.S. at 72-74.
124. Id. at 72 (quoting Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915)). See Crane v. New
York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
125. The Court stated that a "State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integ-
rity of its programs .... But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious
distinctions between classes of its citizens. . . ." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 374-75,
(quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1968)).
The Graham Court also noted that the special public interest doctrine was based on the
notion that "[w]hatever is a privilege, rather than a right, may be made dependent upon
citizenship." 403 U.S. at 374 (quoting People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 164, 108 N.E. 427, 430
(1915)). The notion that government benefits depend on the right-privilege distinction was
rejected by the Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). Accord, Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. at 643:45. But see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976) (suggesting that the rights-privilege distinction may have been reborn in the
area of public employment). See also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 421
(1948) (California's "special public interest" in "ownership" of offshore fish did not justify
an exclusion of permanent resident aliens from state licenses to fish in offshore waters).
126. 441 U.S. at 73-74.
127. See notes 123-25 & accompanying text supra.
128. See note 5 supra.
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teachers employed by and acting as agents of the state.129 The
Court rationalized that the state would not have a similar interest
in private schoolchildren, stating: "[t]he State has a stronger inter-
est in ensuring that the schools it most directly controls, and for
which it bears the cost, are as effective as possible in teaching
these courses." 130 The Ambach majority thus allows the state to
impose a citizenship requirement for a position in the public em-
ploy even though a similar requirement on an identical position in
the private sector would be unconstitutional. In effect, this allows a
state to impose a citizenship requirement on any public employ-
ment position as long as that position fulfills an important govern-
mental function.
The underlying thesis for the Ambach majority's broader view
of the Sugarman exception is a more expansive interpretation of
the meaning of citizenship. The Court found citizenship to be
"fundamental to the definition and government of a state." 13 1 It
reiterated the view that citizenship demonstrated an association
with the polity which exercises the powers of governance. 13 2 The
Court found that this form of association was important; "an oath
of allegiance or similar ceremony cannot substitute for the une-
quivocal legal bond citizenship represents."1 3 The significance of
citizenship gave the state wider latitude in limiting the participa-
tion of noncitizens in the exercise of governmental functions.'"
This broader view of the alien-citizen distinction with its "no sub-
stitution" counterpart, allows the exception to encompass many
more positions. It assumes no other method exists to ensure the
requisite qualifications. It is also an implicit rejection of the princi-
ple that aliens be judged by their individual qualifications and not
by characteristics that all aliens as a class are presumed to have.
13 5
Justice Blackmun, who had concurred in the result in Foley,
refused to join the majority in Ambach, thus indicating that his
interpretation of the breadth of the exception is closer to the view
expressed in the Foley majority opinion. Justice Blackmun ob-
jected to the "government functions" inquiry posed by the major-
129. 441 U.S. at 76 n.6.
130. Id. at 78 n.8.
131. Id. at 75. See note 71 & accompanying text supra.
132. 441 U.S. at 75. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 295.
133. 441 U.S. at 75. See note 72 & accompanying text supra.
134. 441 U.S. at 75. See note 73 & accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 39, 105-10 & accompanying text supra.
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ity, stating that the relevant inquiry in exception cases is whether
the position involves an important nonelective official who exe-
cutes broad public policy.136 He interprets this inquiry as the
"touchstone" of Foley.3 7 Justice Blackmun also disagrees with the
majority's characterization of the alien-citizen distinction as funda-
mental. 38 Thus, he rejects the majority's absolutist view that com-
mitment to the polity's values can be shown by no other method
than citizenship.139 Indeed, most of Justice Blackmun's criticisms
of the majority are directed toward the use of this definition of
citizenship to impose such a broad view of the exception. There are
two major aspects to these criticisms. First, he objects to the fact
that the citizenship requirement is not applicable to private teach-
ers. Noting that private schools accounted for eighteen percent of
the school population, 40 Justice Blackmun states: "[T]he educa-
tion of those pupils seems not to be inculcated with something less
than what is desirable for citizenship .... ',141 Thus Justice Black-
mun rejects an interpretation of the Sugarman exception that
would allow the citizenship requirement for a public but not a sim-
ilar private position. Secondly, he objects to the idea that the value
inherent in citizenship cannot be measured in other ways. "The
State will know how to select its teachers responsibly, wholly apart
from citizenship, and can do so selectively and intelligently.
14 2
Justice Blackmun thus urges that selection of teachers can be
made by a determination of the applicants individual qualifications
rather than on the basis of characteristics that aliens, as a class,
are presumed to have.
The three interpretations of the breadth of the Sugarman ex-
ception can be summarized through a hypothetical. Assume that
State X has a statute requiring all state tax collectors to be citi-
zens. Assume further that two positions are involved, that of the
chief of revenue collection, who has the responsibility for setting
tax policy and administrative guidelines, and that of an auditor,
who is responsible for selecting returns to be audited in accordance
with previously formulated guidelines. Under the Ambach majority
136. 441 U.S. at 82-83 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 82.
138. Id. at 85.
139. Id. at 87-88 & n.7.
140. Id. at 86.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 87.
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opinion, the Court would inquire whether tax collection was an im-
portant governmental function.143 It would look to the role of state
tax collectors and the responsibility and discretion tax collectors
possess in fulfilling that role.144 Assuming that the Court would
find tax collection an important governmental function and that
both the chief of revenue collection and the auditor exercised dis-
cretion in their positions, the Court would find both positions
within the exception. This inclusion would be justified by the
Court's reasoning that a citizenship requirement is valid for such
functions to ensure that the person who exercises governmental
power as a tax collector identifies with the values of the political
community. The citizenship requirement is necessary because
there is no equivalent way to measure commitment to these
values.
14 5
Under the Foley majority opinion's analysis, the Court would
inquire whether tax collectors are important nonelective officials
who execute broad public policy. 4 It would look to the discretion-
ary power involved in the position and whether the execution of
policy in that position could substantially affect members of the
political community,"47 as well as determining that the citizenship
requirement did not sweep indiscriminately.148 Under this analysis,
the Court would undoubtedly find the chief of revenue collection
within the exception because such a position falls within all three
of the Foley criteria. However, the Court might find that the audi-
tor does not fall within the exception because use of power in that
position is limited to previously formulated guidelines and thus
does not have a substantial effect on the populace.
Justice Marshall would find the chief of revenue collection
within the exception because that position involves direct partici-
pation in the formulation and execution of broad public policy."
49
However, the auditor would be outside the exception because that
position merely implements policy.150 Justice Stevens would find
both positions within the exception only if there was an express
143. See note 114 & accompanying text supra.
144. See note 115 & accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 131-34 & accompanying text supra.
146. See note 113 & accompanying text supra.
147. See note 86 & accompanying text supra.
148. See note 87 & accompanying text supra.
149. See note 97 & accompanying text supra.
150. See note 97 & accompanying text supra.
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individual characteristic which would justify the exclusion of a par-
ticular alien.
151
The Proper Standard of Review for Sugarman
Exception Cases
The second issue raised by Foley and Ambach is what stan-
dard of review is proper in Sugarman exception cases. An exami-
nation of the historical origin of the exception shows that the
Sugarman Court made only vague references to the proper stan-
dard. 152 Perhaps a more significant factor in pre-Foley history was
the resistance advanced by some Justices to the elevation of alien-
age to a suspect classification. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief
Justice Burger, reasoned that all classifications based on alienage
should be subject to the rational basis standard.153 However, as
long as the classifications in the common occupations cases con-
tained absolute exclusions of aliens, the majority of the Court was
willing to apply the strict scrutiny standard.
154
The Court's consensus on the application of "strict scrutiny"
to alienage classifactions splintered in Nyquist v. Mauclet.5 5 A
different type of statute presented itself in Nyquist. Like the stat-
ute in Ambach, it excluded from higher education financial aid
benefits only those aliens who chose to retain their foreign citizen-
ship. 51 Justice Blackmun, writing for a five to four majority, 57 ap-
151. See notes 111-12 & accompanying text supra.
152. The Sugarman Court indicated that a lesser standard than strict scrutiny would
apply. "[O]ur scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly
within a State's constitutional prerogatives." 413 U.S. at 648.
153. Id. at 658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 730 (1973)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
154. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), eight Justices voted to classify
alienage as a suspect classification; Justice Harlan did not join in that part of the opinion,
but concurred in the judgment. In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), the vote was 8-
1, with Justice Rehnquist dissenting. In In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), the vote was 7-
2, with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissenting. In Examining Bd. of Eng'rs
v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), the vote was 7-1, Justice Rehnquist dissenting and
Justice Stevens taking no part in the case.
155. 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
156. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 661(3)(McKinney Supp. 1976) provided: "Citizenship. An ap-
plicant (a) must be a citizen of the United States, or (b) must have made application to
become a citizen, or (c) if not qualified for citizenship, must submit a statement affirming
intent to apply for United States citizenship as soon as he has the qualifications, and must
apply as soon as eligible for citizenship.... "
157. The majority consisted of Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, White,
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plied strict scrutiny. The Court held that although the statute was
not an absolute bar to aliens, this did not mean that it did not
discriminate against a suspect class.158 Justice Powell, dissenting,
viewed the discriminatory line as drawn between voluntary aliens
and all others.159 Because the indicia of a suspect class60 were not
present, he declined to apply strict scrutiny.""1 Justice Rehnquist,
also dissenting, found that the classification did not impinge on a
"discrete and insular minority."'162 Because the aliens could remove
the disability created by the statute, there was no need for strict
scrutiny.163 Thus, four members of the Court are of the opinion
that strict scrutiny should not apply to an alienage classification if
the statute is not an absolute ban or if it is structured so that the
alien suffers disability only if he or she retains his or her alienage.
With a fifth vote, this interpretation could constitute another ex-
ception to the doctrine of alienage as a suspect classification. More
importantly, however, it indicates a movement in the Court to
limit the application of strict scrutiny in alienage cases.
With respect to the Sugarman exception, three views exist
within the Court as to what standard of review should be applied.
Each corresponds to one of the three interpretations of the scope
of the Sugarman exception discussed earlier."6 The first of these
views is expressed in the Foley majority opinion in which the
Court held that "[t]he State need only justify its classification by a
showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought
to be protected and the limiting classification."'I6 At first glance,
Marshall, and Stevens. Two dissents were filed. One was written by Justice Powell and
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart. The second dissent was written by Jus-
tice Rehnquist and was joined by Chief Justice Burger.
158. 432 U.S. at 9. "The Court has never suggested ... that the suspect class is to be
defined so narrowly... [T]he element of voluntariness . . .is a recognized element in
several of the Court's decisions." Id. at 9 n.11.
159. Id. at 15 (Powell, J., dissenting).
160. Justice Powell identified these criteria as whether the class is "'saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." Id. (quoting San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 28 (1973)). See also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938). See note 9 supra.
161. 432 U.S. at 15.
162. Id. at 20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 20-21.
164. See notes 86-142 & accompanying text supra.
165. 435 U.S. at 296.
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the Court appears to apply the traditional rational basis test.88
However, the application of this test must be viewed in the context
of the factors the Court used to determine whether the exception
applied: whether the position involved discretionary decisionmak-
ing and the exercise of power having a direct and substantial effect
on the political community, and whether the statute swept indis-
criminately "without regard to the position involved.11' 7 When
these factors are combined with the rational basis test, something
more than the traditional test in fact is applied. In effect, these
factors perform a narrowing function before any standard of review
is applied by excluding those statutes which do not involve discre-
tionary decisionmaking, a substantial affect on the community, or
which are not related to the purpose of the statute. A traditional
rational basis test"' would not include such a narrowing process.
However, once the category of permissible statutes is narrowed, the
rational basis test almost always will find that a citizenship re-
quirement is a rational means of ensuring the "preservation of the
political community."
This narrowing process was not adopted in the Ambach major-
ity opinion. Rather, the Ambach Court stated that classifications
within the Sugarman exception "would not invite as demanding
scrutiny . *... ,9 However, the Court's purported rational basis
test must again be viewed in the context of the Court's criteria for
defining the Sugarman exception. Because its emphasis was simply
whether the position entailed an important governmental function,
the Ambach majority defined the exception with less restrictive
criteria than the Foley Court and did not include the "substantial
effect" factor and "relatedness" caveat of Foley.70 As a result, the
Sugarman exception was expanded to include more statutes.
Under both Foley and Ambach, the Court appears to utilize
this two-step approach. First, the determination is made as to
166. See note 18 supra.
167. 435 U.S. at 296-97. See notes 48-49, 87-88 & accompanying text supra.
168. The traditional rational basis test, see note 18 supra, is not to be confused with a
more demanding version of the rational basis test which the Court has used on occasion.
See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in which the Court announced that the classifica-
tion in question "'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' Id. at 76 (quoting Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
169. 441 U.S. at 74.
170. See notes 48-49, 86-87, 167 & accompanying text supra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
September 19801 ALIENAGE AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
whether the statute falls within the Sugarman exception. Follow-
ing this determination, the Court determines which standard of re-
view shall apply."" The crucial question in determining the valid-
ity of the statute is therefore whether it is included within the
exception. If the statute is included, it most likely will be upheld
under the rational basis test. In this way, the Ambach case pro-
vides for a more relaxed test than Foley, although under the same
standard of rational basis.
Justices Marshall and Stevens, in their respective Foley dis-
sents,172 indicate they oppose both of these rational basis tests and
reject the majority's two-step approach. Justice Marshall views the
proper standard of review for exception cases to be strict scru-
tiny. 17  He stated in his Foley dissent: "Sugarman may thus be
viewed as defining the circumstances under which laws excluding
aliens from state jobs would further a compelling state interest,
rather than as defining the circumstances under which lesser scru-
tiny is applicable."''1 He also stated that the Sugarman Court did
not explain "why the level of scrutiny should vary with the nature
of the job . . . . ,,7Thus, Justice Marshall is opposed to the case
by case approach developed by the majorities in Ambach and
Foley.
The emphasis in Justice Stevens' dissent is on the need for a
statute that makes an individualized determination of an alien's
employment qualifications instead of prejudgment based on char-
acteristics that aliens, as a class, are presumed to have.Y6 His con-
cern appears to be that statutes like those upheld in Foley and
Ambach are imprecise. 7 7 Justice Stevens sees the need for statutes
within the exception that are drawn precisely so as to exclude only
those who individually do not meet the job qualifications. Like the
requirement of a "compelling state interest,' 71 8 this precision argu-
ment is one of the characteristics of the strict scrutiny test.1
79
171. See notes 49, 88, 167 & accompanying text supra.
172. Justice Brennan joined the dissents of both Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens.
173. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 303 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See note 58
& accompanying text supra.
174. Id. at 303 n.1.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Id.
178. See note 10 supra.
179. See NowAx, supra note 10, at 524. "Even if the government can demonstrate [a
compelling state interest] the Court will not uphold the classification unless the justices
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Thus, under the standard Justices Marshall and Stevens would ap-
ply in the exception cases, the statute would have to further a
compelling state interest and employ means which are precisely
drawn to achieve the state's interest.
Justice Blackmun adds further confusion by his dissent in
Ambach, stating that strict scrutiny should apply in that case. 80
His dissent argues that the statute should employ more precise
means, 81 and advocates better methods for the state to achieve its
goal. 82 This concern with precision becomes clear when it is recog-
nized that Justice Blackmun is the only Justice who concurred in
the Foley result, but who dissented in Ambach. Thus, he may be
seen as the only Justice still willing to apply the "stricter" rational
basis test applied in Foley to the exception cases.
The exception cases demonstrate the inherent clash between
the citizenship value and the individualized determination value.
Ideally, these conflicting values would be balanced so as to serve
both values, providing aliens the greatest access possible to govern-
ment jobs while at the same time reserving important policymak-
ing positions to citizens. Under the present practice, however, this
balance is heavily weighted toward the citizenship value. s
There are two reasons for this uneven balance. The first is the
present definition of the Sugarman exception set forth in the
Ambach majority opinion. By placing its emphasis on what is an
important governmental function rather than on whether the posi-
tion is an important one for the formulation, execution, or review
of broad public policy, the exception potentially can encompass al-
most any profession which exercises an important governmental
function including those which have little relation to "preservation
of the political community." Ambach itself illustrates this problem.
J
have independently reached the conclusion that the classification is necessary to promote
that compelling interest. If the justices are of the opinion that the classification need not be
employed to achieve such an end, the law will be held to violate the equal protection guar-
antee." Id.
In Sugarman, the Court stated the strict scrutiny test in the following manner. "We
therefore look to the substantiality of the State's interest in enforcing the statute in ques-
tion, and to the narrowness of the limits within which the discrimination is confined." 413
U.S. at 642. See also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 722 (the state must show that "its use of the
classification is 'necessary. . .to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of
its interest").
180. 441 U.S. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 87.
182. Id. at 87-88.
183. See notes 86-96, 114-35 & accompanying text supra.
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Under the Court's reasoning in Ambach, the citizenship require-
ment is applicable to all teachers because all teachers have "an
obligation to promote civic virtues and understanding in their
classes."' ' Yet, as Justice Blackmun points out in his dissent, "[ilt
seems constitutionally absurd, to say . . a Frenchman may not
teach French .. "..",185 Such a position seems a far cry from an
important nonelective official who executes broad public policy.
Secondly, the application of the rational basis test in the ex-
ception cases promotes the dominance of the citizenship value over
the individualized determination value. Under the traditional ver-
sion of the rational basis test, a statute will be upheld if the Court
can conceive of any rational relation between the means and the
state's interest.21 6 The Court does not scrutinize the validity of a
state's interest, but accepts the asserted state interest in deference
to the state legislature.8 7 The danger in this is that the state can
use the asserted interest as a front for an impermissible interest.
This often has been done in the past with alienage classifica-
tions.18 Moreover, the test requires only that the means be ra-
tional, not the best or most precise.18 As a result, the Court does
not scrutinize the means utilized to determine if less discrimina-
tory alternatives are available.
The effect of the application of the rational basis test in
Sugarman exception cases is most evident in Foley and Ambach.
184. 441 U.S. at 80.
185. Id. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
186. See note 18 supra.
187. See NowAK, supra note 10, at 524. "The Court will not grant any significant re-
view of legislative decisions to classify persons in terms of general economic legislation. In
this area the judges have determined they have no unique function to perform; they have no
institutional capability to assess the scope of legitimate governmental ends in these areas or
the reasonableness of classifications that is in any way superior to that of the legislature.
Thus if a classification is of this type the Court will ask only whether it is conceivable that
the classification bears a rational relationship to an end of government which is not prohib-
ited by the Constitution. So long as it is arguable that the other branch of government had
such a basis for creating the classification the Court will not invalidate the law." Id.
188. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (state asserted con-
servation as interest in statute which barred aliens ineligible for citizenship from com-
mercial fishing licenses; only Japanese resident aliens were ineligible for citizenship); Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (state argued that law which conclusively presumed that
conveyances of agricultural land purchased by an ineligible alien father and recorded in his
citizen son's name was not a gift but that land was held for father and thus provided for an
escheat to the state, was necessary to avoid evasion of alien land law's prohibition of land
ownership by ineligible aliens; again, only group of ineligible aliens were Japanese).
189. See notes 18, 187 supra.
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In both cases, the Court accepted the state's asserted interest-
assuring that those who exercise power in the political community
are familiar with the community's values-as valid.9 0 It then
found that a citizenship requirement is a rational means of fur-
thering this interest because of the presumption that citizens share
in the values of the political community and aliens do not. 91 Ac-
cording to the Court, therefore, the exclusion of aliens from police
and teaching positions did not violate the equal protection
guarantee.
Factors the Court Should Consider in Defining the
Sugarman Exception
In order to better balance the competing values involved in
the Sugarman exception and to provide greater access to govern-
ment jobs for aliens while at the same time reserving important
policymaking positions for citizens, it is necessary to revise the fac-
tors that define the exception. Keeping in mind the original ratio-
nale given by the Sugarman Court for the exception-to preserve
the basic conception of the political community' 92-the Court
should look closely at several factors so as to define the exception
in a more precise manner.
First, the Court should look at whether the position serves a
traditional state function at the "heart of representative democ-
racy." 193 Traditional functions of the state include police and fire
service, schools, courts, legislatures, welfare systems, highway
maintenance, and recreational facilities. However, not all these
traditional functions are at the heart of representative democracy
such that democratic theory would be impaired by having an alien
eligible for such employment. For example, firefighters clearly per-
form a traditional state function, but not one at the heart of repre-
sentative democracy, because a firefighter exercises no power over
the political community. Under this analysis, firefighters would not
be included within the exception. Conversely, the courts and the
legislature are traditonal functions at the heart of representative
democracy and should be within the exception because of the
190. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 295-96; Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. at 73-74.
191. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 299-300; Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. at 80-
81.
192. See note 30 & accompanying text supra.
193. See note 30 & accompanying text supra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol 32
ALIENAGE AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
power they may exercise over the political community. Thus, by
requiring the position to be both a traditional governmental func-
tion and at the heart of representative democracy, the exception
would include only those positions where a citizenship requirement
is necessary to ensure that the political community is governed by
its members.
194
Second, the Court should look at the extent to which the
power inherent in the position is capable of having a direct, imme-
diate, tangible, and substantial effect on the lives of citizens.
Within many traditional state functions at the heart of representa-
tive democracy are numerous positions with varying levels of
power. The Court should use this factor to determine which posi-
tions within the traditional function are within the exception. Posi-
tions that include the power to deprive a person of liberty, prop-
erty, or other rights, like the police power in Foley, would provide
a strong argument for inclusion within the exception because the
exercise of such power has a substantial effect on the members of
the political community. A citizenship requirement for such posi-
tions would ensure that the powers of government are exercised by
members of that political community. Positions that exercise indi-
rect power, such as a teaching position, would present a weaker
case as the effect of such power would be less substantial and im-
mediate, resulting in less intrusion into the lives of citizens in the
political community.
A further consideration in determining whether direct or in-
direct power is exercised is whether the position is one which
actually creates policy as compared with one which merely imple-
ments policy. Positions of "responsibility for actually setting gov-
ernment policy pursuant to a delegation of substantial authority
from the legislature" 195 should be within the exception. Such a po-
sition is one which participates in the "formulation, execution, or
review of broad public policy." 96 A more difficult question arises
as to administrative positions. With regard to such positions, the
Court should consider the amount of discretionary power involved
in the position. If the administrative officer applies policy only
within a narrowly defined range of choices and his or her decisions
194. See note 6 supra.
195. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 304 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See note 98 & accom-
panying text supra.
196. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647.
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are reviewed by a superior, the position should be excluded from
the exception because the administrator would lack discretionary
power with which he or she could have a substantial effect on the
lives of citizens.197 For example, under this analysis, a state tax au-
ditor who selects returns for auditing under previously formulated
administrative guidelines should not be within the exception.
Third, the Court should consider whether the state's interest
can be maintained by selection processes that provide that each
person be judged on individual qualifications rather than pre-
sumed class characteristics. At the heart of this question is the
true meaning of the alien-citizen distinction. The meaning of citi-
zenship is difficult to isolate and is often clouded by intangible and
the well intentioned emotion that surrounds the concept. Such fac-
tors, however, should not prevent the Court from considering
whether citizenship is a viable means of ensuring commitment to
the values of the political community. It is entirely possible that an
alien is more knowledgeable of and committed to American values
than an American citizen. Yet, because of the present state of the
exception, the citizen and not the alien is eligible for employment.
When used in this context, the citizenship requirement appears to
be more of a reward mechanism for becoming a citizen rather than
a measure of job qualifications. The Court should consider whether
citizenship should be used by the states as a vehicle for obtaining
employment or whether it should have a purer meaning.
An Intermediate Standard of Review
In addition to adopting a precise definition of the Sugarman
exception, the adoption of an intermediate standard of review will
allow a more even balancing of the competing values in Sugarman
exception cases. This standard of review would provide two advan-
tages. First, it would provide the Court a middle ground between
the "fatal in fact" 19 8 strict scrutiny test and the extremely deferen-
tial rational basis test, thus avoiding the harsh results of the two-
tier approach where the state's interest seldom meets strict scru-
tiny and virtually always is upheld under the rational basis test.
Second, the intermediate standard would better balance the
197. See notes 48, 86 & accompanying text supra.
198. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. RPv. 1, 8 (1972).
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individualized determination and citizenship values by accepting
the state's interest, yet requiring that the means have a substantial
relation to the state's interest and not be overly inclusive.19 This
balancing would be consistent with the rationale underlying the
exception because the individualized determination value would
give way only when necessary to preserve an important state inter-
est. Three major intermediate standards of review have been pro-
posed. These include Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" ap-
proach,00 Professor Gunther's "newer equal protection" test,20 1
and Professor Nowak's demonstrable basis standard.
202
199. See notes 200-02 & accompanying text infra.
200. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-22 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall's model does not involve rigid factors like the Gunther and Nowak models,
but operates on a "sliding scale." Justice Marshall believes that the degree of scrutiny in
equal protection cases should vary according to the "constitutional and societal importance
of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which
the particular classification is drawn." San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99
(Marshall, J., dissenting). To determine the degree of scrutiny in relation to these criteria
the Court should look to three factors: (1) the character of the classification in question, (2)
the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the government
benefits they do not receive, and (3) the asserted state interests in support of the classifica-
tion. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 318; San Antonio Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. at 90; Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. at 521. Under Justice Marshall's approach, a scale is set up with suspect classifications
on one end receiving the highest scrutiny and economic classifications on the other receiving
minimal scrutiny.
201. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAxv. L. Rav. 1 (1972). The test under Professor Gunther's
"newer equal protection" is that "legislative classifications must have a substantial relation-
ship to legislative purposes . . . ." Id. at 20. Professor Gunther sees his model as "means-
focused." Id. The Court would "assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that have a
substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture." Id. at 21. Once the state has estab-
lished its actual purpose, the state would have to show that the means substantially fur-
thered that interest. The reasonableness of the means would be judged "on the basis of
materials that are offered to the Court," not by hypothesizing. Id. Thus, the state must
show its interest and its means have some substance in fact.
For alienage classifications, this model achieves a more even balance of the conflicting
values. The state's interest in preserving the political community is accepted as long as the
state shows that preservation is the actual interest. However, crucial to this balance is the
fact that Professor Gunther's model will scrutinize the state's means to show that the means
are actually related to the interest, thus ensuring greater consideration of the individualized
determination value.
202. Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guar-
antee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 Gao. L.J. 1071 (1974). Pro-
fessor Nowak's model is similar to Professor Gunther's model, except that it involves greater
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The United States Supreme Court adopted an intermediate
standard of review for sex classifications in Craig v. Boren,2 03 hold-
ing that "classifications by gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives. ' 20 4 Although the Craig Court did not
provide a precise definition of this standard, its requirements and
limits can be implied from its application in that case. It appears
that under the standard, the Court will accept the state's asserted
interest as long as it does not fall into a narrow category of imper-
20missible purposes. 05 However, the Court noted that certain pur-
poses such as administrative convenience, 0 6 or "'archaic and over-
broad' generalizations" about the role of women that tended to
keep them in the home and out of business affairs,20 7 could not
support gender classifications. Thus, the Court will not accept
merely any asserted state interest; the interest must serve an im-
portant governmental objective.
Similarly, under the Craig standard, the means employed by
the state to effectuate its interests are scrutinized more carefully.
In Craig, the Court found that the relationship between gender
scrutiny of the state's interest and means. Professor Nowak includes alienage within his
concept of neutral classifications, id. at 1099, which he defines as those classifications that
treat persons in a dissimilar manner on the basis of some inherent human characteristic or
status. Id. at 1093-94. For statutes based on neutral classifications, Nowak would apply his
demonstrable basis standard-the Court would validate the classification "only if it has a
factually demonstrable rational relationship to a legitimate state end." Id. at 1094. This test
involves two parts. First, it asks whether "there is any theoretically rational relation be-
tween the classification and a state interest capable of withstanding analysis." Id. at 1081. If
such a relation could not be found, there would be no further inquiry. However, if such a
relation exists, the Court must determine whether in fact the classification is arbitrary. Id.
Professor Nowak states that the Court would "look to principles either express or implied in
the Constitution for guidance in determining whether the State's interest is capable of with-
standing analysis." Id. at 1095. Thus, one can assume that any purpose which is constitu-
tionally permissible is capable of withstanding analysis. Once it shows that its interest is
permissible, the state must then demonstrate that the means chosen is a rational way of
advancing the state's interest. Id. at 1081. The state must show that the means chosen sup-
ports the interest so as to ensure that the classification is "not being used arbitrarily to
burden persons having a common personal status." Id.
203. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
204. Id. at 197.
205. Craig dealt with an Oklahoma law which prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to
females under age 18 and males under age 21. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (1958 &
Supp. 1976). The Court accepted Oklahoma's asserted interest of traffic safety, based on
statistics which showed that males had a higher incidence of alcohol-related accidents than
females. 429 U.S. at 199.
206. 429 U.S. at 198.
207. Id. at 198-99.
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and the state's asserted interest in traffic safety was far too tenu-
ous to satisfy the "requirement that gender-based difference be
substantially related to the achievement of the statutory objec-
tive."208 Thus the means must be more precisely tailored than
under the traditional rational basis test.2 e0
The reasoning for adopting an intermediate standard of review
for sex classifications is applicable to the adoption of a similar
standard for the Sugarman exception. First, sex and alienage clas-
sifications have several similarities. Both classifications have a his-
tory of use for discriminatory purposes.210 Moreover, alienage, like
sex, often bears no relation to the ability to perform and often rele-
gates those within the classification to an inferior legal status with-
out regard to individual capacity.211 Although the states have ar-
gued that the status of alienage carries with it a presumption that
aliens are not as loyal or committed to the polity as citizens,21 2 no
reason exists to believe this is universally true. An alien may be
highly qualified, loyal to the polity, and committed to its values,
and still prefer to retain foreign citizenship. Indeed, in many cases,
an alien may have more knowledge of and commitment to these
values than a citizen. However, under alienage classifications such
208. Id. at 204.
209. See note 18 supra.
210. Justice Brennan, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), compared the
legal position of 19th century women to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.
"Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own
names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey
property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children." Id. at 685. See Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975) (statute required parental support for females until age 18,
but until age 21 for males based on notion that "girls tend generally to mature physically,
emotionally, and mentally before boys" and "tend to marry earlier") (quoting Stanton v.
Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 318, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1974)); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,
421 (1908) ("[h]istory discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man.
He established his control at the outset by superior physical strength, and this control in
various forms, with diminishing intensity, has continued to the present .... IS]he has been
looked upon in courts as needing especial care that her rights may be preserved"); Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) ("[t]he natural and proper timidity and deli-
cacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life"). See also L. KAuowrrz, SEx RoLEs m LAw AND SocmTY 42-74 (1973).
211. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statute gave automatic preference to men
over women for appointment as administrator of estates); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961) (unanimous decision upholding law allowing state to limit women jurors to volun-
teers); Goesasert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding prohibition on women bar-
tenders). See also L. KA owrrz, Sax RoLEs iN LAW ArD SocIETY 299-456 (1973).
212. See Appellee's Motion to Affirm at 6, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); see
also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 302 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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as that in Ambach, it is impossible to show this individual
capacity.
Another argument in favor of adopting an intermediate stan-
dard for Sugarman exception cases is that such a standard would
make the exception cases more consistent with alienage cases in-
volving private employment. Citizenship requirements in private
employment and benefit programs outside the Sugarman excep-
tion continue to be suspect,213 justified only when the state shows
that its interest is both constitutionally permissible and substan-
tial and that its use of the classification is necessary to the accom-
plishment of its purpose.214 In contrast, the test presently used in
exception cases requires only a rational relation between the state's
means and its interest.2 5 Thus, the standard of review varies from
one extreme to the other solely on the basis of government employ-
ment even though in some cases, like Ambach, the same type of
position is involved.
Adoption of the Craig intermediate standard of review in the
Sugarman exception cases would close this gap by promoting a
better balance between the competing citizenship and individual-
ized determination values. The citizenship value would receive
proper consideration because the Court would undoubtedly find
"preservation of the political community" to be an important gov-
ernmental objective.210 In addition, however, the individualized de-
termination value would receive greater consideration because of
the increased scrutiny of the state's means involved in the Craig
standard.217 The Court would be faced with the question of
whether an absolute exclusion of aliens from important govern-
mental positions is substantially related to the state's interest in
preserving the political community. More specifically, the Court
would face the issue of whether a citizenship requirement ensures
that those who fill these positions are loyal to the polity and com-
mitted to its values. Because the Court would give proper consider-
ation to both values, there would be a better balancing of the right
of aliens to work in the common occupations of the community
213. Neither Foley nor Ambach purported to overrule or limit the Graham-
Sugarman-Griffiths line of cases. Both dealt only with the Sugarman exception. See Foley
v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 294-95; Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. at 73-74.
214. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973).
215. See notes 18, 165, 169 & accompanying text supra.
216. See note 6 supra.
217. See notes 208-09 & accompanying text supra.
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with the state's interest to preserve its political community. The
result, hopefully, will be that alienage classifications in exception
cases will be tailored so as to exclude only those necessary to pre-
serve the state's interest.
Conclusion
The majority opinion in Ambach demonstrates that the Court
is moving toward a relaxed view of the Sugarman exception. This
trend is probably a result of the Court's desire to move away from
the concept of alienage as a suspect classification and the strict
scrutiny test that concept entails. However, the effect of the
Court's relaxed view is that states will be able to exclude aliens
from occupations in the public sector when such an exclusion on a
similar position in the private sector would be constitutionally im-
permissible. The inevitable result is that aliens are judged on the
basis of their status rather than on their individual characteristics.
Unless the Court is willing to ignore totally the individualized de-
termination value which underlies its pre-Foley alienage cases, it
can avoid this result, and at the same time maintain the state's
right to preserve its political community, by the formulation of a
sharper definition of the factors that define the Sugarman excep-
tion and by application of an intermediate standard of review
which provides an impartial analysis of the conflicting values un-
derlying the exception. Such a standard would recognize the im-
portance of the state's interest and at the same time require the
statute to be tailored so as to exclude only those necessary to pre-
serve the state's political community. In this way the Court can
achieve a better balance between the right of aliens to work in the
common occupations of the community and the state's right to de-
fine its own political community.
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